E.H. Carr: Realism vs. Idealism

As economic crises, natural disasters and health epidemics come and go, becoming increasingly frequent, the interactions between various countries are of greater importance as national interests override one another. These interplays between nations are enhanced by globalization and the development of technology, as well as the growth in the flux not only of people, but of ideas. Hence, understanding the fundamentals of international relations, the values and priorities on which it relies, is essential to creating a stable and functioning international society. To be able to better live with our neighbours, we must first be able to determine the aspects of our relationship that predominate, as well as our own inherent tendencies in relationships.

International relations has always been plagued by the seeming battle between its two major doctrines-- realism and Idealism. Realism is of course power politics and an ideology in which national interests and security always trump morals and international values. Realism sheds the international relation's exterior carcass of morals and ethics and unveils the more self-interested aspect of decision-making and international co-operation. Machiavelli and Hobbes are prime examples of classical realists, as they state that it is the nature of man to place interests over ideology. That is to say, man is inherently prone to making decisions and pursuing actions according to his own personal desires, those of others and his moral obligations notwithstanding. 

Idealism, on the other hand, is a political ideology based on the belief that human nature is inherently good. It is personified by the former American president Woodrow Wilson, and suggests that the goal of a state's foreign policy should be determined by  its internal political philosophy. In other words, legal and ethical standards are what should guide foreign policy, not power plays as suggests realism. Whilst realism relies on the belief that man is inherently bad, realism relies on the belief that man is good and capable of progress. Hence, in idealism the desires of the people, the majority, were what guided decisions, be it on foreign policy or during the aftermath of a war -- the people were seen as intelligent and kind-hearted, and hence their decision-making was assumed to follow the same lines. 

Though at first glance, the preferred political ideology rampant in international relations may seem inconsequential, its impact on decisions made following eras of crises are ubiquitous. For example, the decision-making in the interwar years of 1919-39 were greatly inspired by Wilsonian Idealism. The Treaty of Versailles, and hence, the creation of the League of Nations were all inspired by the belief that public opinion was bound to prevail and that public opinion was the voice of reason [1]. It was this utopian way of thinking that led British historian and international relations scholar, E.H. Carr to believe that it was the principles behind the League that would lead to its eventual downfall, rather than the individuals or the lack of American support [2]. Carr was a classical realist who maintained that states are the main actors in world politics and that they are deeply committed to pursuing power at each other’s expense [3], and believed that the utopian and idealistic ideology rampant during the interwar era was what ultimately led to the Second World War. By analyzing the events that followed the end of the First World War, that is to say, the creation and implementation of the League of Nations, the on-going conflict between France and Great Britain, and the Manchuria and Abyssinia crises, it is quite easy to see that Carr was correct in believing that the popularity of idealism during that time, was what led to further disasters in the near future. 

The sudden end of WWI in November 1918, left Europe in chaos. Entire countries were destroyed, armies and economies decimated, and a sense of confusion lay siege over the entire continent. In all, more than 10 million people had died, France, Russia and Germany being some of the hardest hit in terms of casualties and economic destruction. Hence, when came time for the Allied Powers to meet at the Versailles Conference in January 1919, they discussed not only matters concerning German disarmament and reparations, but also the creation of an intergovernmental organization focused on the maintenance of peace across the globe. 

The German Armistice had been signed on the basis of Wilson's Fourteen Points, which embodied Wilson's idealistic thought. However, upon coming into discussions with the leaders of the other Allied Powers, many of the points suffered concessions that led to a Treaty that pleased none of its contributors. As David Williamson stated in his book, War and Peace-International Relations 1919-39, ' Its key clauses were the result of fiercely negotiated agreements, which were often only reached when the conference appeared on the brink of collapse'. National interests and the various priorities of the different states, all inspired by their desires to either acquire power or to maintain a balance of power, impeded the creation of a truly functioning peace treaty.For example, it was only after French objections regarding the inclusion of Germany in the League of Nations were dealt with, that the first 26 articles of the Treaty, containing the Covenant of the League of Nations, were agreed upon unanimously [4]. The idealism of Wilson's Fourteen Points was undermined by the power plays regulating the priorities of the Allied Powers. 

The problems that plagued the writing of the Treaty of Versailles followed throughout the creation and implementation of Wilson's prized League of Nations. For Wilson, the League of Nations was to be a 'world parliament' that would have four major goals: preventing wars, improving people's livelihoods, disarmament and enforcing the Treaty of Versailles. The League had four powers it could use to bend the wills of countries: its covenant which bound all members to keep peace, its power of condemnation, its arbitration and its sanctions. However, the lack of military force was to be a deciding factor in the League's demise, as it had no physical power over its members and other countries. This idealistic institution relied on the good will of its members, on their good judgement and actual commitment to the creation of a safe and stable international society. This of course goes against the classical realist thinking advocated by Carr, who asserted that ‘the ultima ratio of power in international relations is war’and which led him to conclude that the military is of 'supreme importance'. Whilst the post-war idealists believed in non-violent international co-operation, realists such as Carr were more aware of the importance of military force in implementing and maintaining international peace. 

According to Carr, ‘international politics are always power politics; for it is impossible to eliminate power from them.’ The League of Nations was from the very beginning paralysed by the fact that it lacked the membership of three of the world's most powerful countries, the U.S.A., Germany and Russia. This refusal to join, or in the case of Germany, the forced exclusion, were but the first signs that the League of Nations would never be able to reach its full potential and supported Carr's belief that nationalism was always superior to the propoganda of world utopia. National interest was what prevented Russia, the U.S.A. and Germany (in this case, the national interest of France) from joining the League. 

The battle between national interest and the creation of a secure international society was most apparent in the continued disputes between the 2 major leaders of the League--Great Britain and France. Both countries had very different priorities and opinions when it came to dealing with the aftermath of the First World War, and these differences were to follow them throughout the drafting of the Treaty of Versailles and the implementation of the League of Nations. Whilst France had suffered a total number of casualties of 1.3 million dead and 2.8 million wounded, and felt directly targeted by any rise in German power, Britain had already achieved much of its aims before the Versailles Conference and was more focused on creating a balance of power.

One such example of the national interests of the Great Powers overpowering their desire for international peace came during discussions over the future of the Rhineland during the Paris Peace Conference. The French wished to occupy the Rhine purely because it presented a 'unique opportunity to weaken Germany permanently' [5]. However the British strongly opposed such a course of action as they feared that it would create increased tension between France and Germany, as well as tilt the balance of power in Europe towards France [6]. The eventual concession (Allied occupation of the Rhineland for a 15-year period) satisfied and pleased none of the Allied Powers. These disagreements over territorial settlements continued after the creation of the League of Nations, when it came time to decide on plebiscites and which territories were to come under the protection of the League. For example, the future of Upper Silesia, a large Prussian province rich in coal mines, was cause of much disagreements between France and Britain. Whilst France was determined that Silesia become a part of Poland, Great Britain was focused on preventing any further weakening of the German State by insisting that Silesia remain German. What resulted was an uprising in May 1921, in which the Poles seized control of the industrial area, with the French unofficially recognizing the rebel's authority and a final decision by the League to hand over most of the industrial areas to Poland [7]. All of this shows that as long as national interests dominated the desire of international peace and safety, disputes would always paralyse the League's ability to function properly. 

The predominance of national interests and the League's inability to use military force finally culminated in the Manchuria and Abyssinia crises of 1931 and 1935. Following the Wall Street Crash, Italy and Japan feeling the repercussions of the ensuing Great Depression, were prompted to expand their spheres of influence and occupy various territories in order to acquire more resources. In Japan, the economic crisis inspired an influential group of army officers to seize the Chinese territory of Manchuria in 1931. Upon being appealed to by China, the League of Nations responded cautiously, by sending a commission of enquiry a year later, in the spring of 1932. This late and insufficient response was due to the lack of commitment of the great powers to use force against Japan. The United States, considering the economic context, were unwilling to do more than denounce the Japanese aggression, whilst the British were sometimes argued to be secretly supporting the Japanese as they had sympathy with Japanese action since it also had commercial interests in China [8]. When, finally, in February 1933, the League of Nations ordered Japan to leave Manchuria, It merely refused and withdrew from the League in Protest. Nothing was done in response as many countries had important trading links with Japan and the League could not agree on sanctions [9].As Willamson said in his book : 'It was obvious that only armed intervention by the great powers would now be able to force it out of Manchuria, and that option was not politically realistic in 1933'. However, as Carr was oft to say, 'International politics are always power politics'. 

The Great Depression had a similar effect on Italy who, like Japan, decided to expand its territory and spheres of influence by occupying a region in the horn of Africa called Abyssinia, as a manner to not only gain new resources but also to take away attention from the impact of the Great Depression on the Italian economy. As Mussolini began his objection in October 1935, he didn't expect France nor Britain to raise any serious objections. However, facing the scale and brutality of the Italian invasion, the British government, facing an election in November, was receiving pressure to support the league and, along with France, feared the diplomatic consequences of alienating Italy over Abyssinia. October 1935 saw the League condemning Italian action and escalating a program of sanctions. However, despite this, both the French and British governments were secretly working on a plan that would place two thirds of Abyssinia under Italian control, that was eventually leaked and put to an end. The entire crisis resulted in decease of the League (as A.J.P. Taylor said in 1966) and the triumph of national interests over the establishment of world peace. 

All of these events prove Carr's belief that it was indeed the idealistic ideology rampant in the inter-war era that led to the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939. The true reason why the treaties adopted betwen 1919 and 1939 were ineffective lies in the fact that  they were idealistic and made by leaders that were determined to radically transform world politics and create a peaceful international order where statesmen no longer cared about the balance of power [10]. The idealism of that period prevented the world leaders from truly understanding and embracing the inherent manner in which they related with one another, that is to say, the manner in which power plays influenced their priorities and actions. As Carr suggested, it was more reasonable at that time to look towards strong leaders like Stalin and Hitler, as they were less likely to succumb to weak utopian visions. 

In conclusion: 

Realism -1

Idealism -0.

Michael Ignatieff, the idealist

Human rights have always and always will play an important role in foreign affairs and diplomacy. The horrors of previous genocides (Holocaust, Rwanda, etc.) have insured that the avoidance of another such cataclysm is of great import to all nations. However, whilst its importance is renowned and incontestable, its maintenance throughout the world, be it through financial or military aid, is oft at odds with national interests. Hence, one must question the interplay of human rights and national interests- which presides over the other?

I am of the belief that human rights should always guide a country's decisions, should it have the possibility and power to do so, a view that is shared by Canadian politician Michael Ignatieff. Ignatieff is currently the leader of the Liberal Party of Canada, and is an acclaimed historian, author, university professor and diplomat. However, what separates Ignatieff from his fellows politicians, and indeed what endears him most to me, is his cosmopolitanism and adherence to liberal interventionism.

Cosmopolitanism is 'a way of thinking about ethics and responsability [...], cosmopolitans refuse to distinguish between fellow citizens and total strangers' [1]. I completely agree with this internationalist way of thinking. Whilst nationalism creates unecessary boundaries between people, separating nations and creating feelings of superiority and inferiority, internationalism (and hence cosmopolitanism)  brings people together by eliminating cultural boundaries, and instauring and maintaining global values and morals with the same ardency all throughout the world. Cosmopolitanism would allow for a greater proliferation of democracy and human rights by developing man's inherent social compass.

While I find the concept of western 'moral imagination' (man's ability to place himself in another's shoe by an act of imagination [2] ), very intersting, I don't believe that it, coupled with the use of historical evidence of the outcome of inaction regarding human rights crises, will be enough to displace the selfish priorities of Western nations. The influences of nationalism and capitalism are too far rooted in our society to truly be shaken by bringing up the past and appealing to man's continually fading sense of morality. When forced to choose between national interests and moral obligation, developed nations such as the United States and France will always choose national interest.

One might quote France and the United State's choice to send military aid to Libya to fight Ghadaffi's army through Nato's implementation of a no-fly zone [3]  as an example of human rights presiding over national interests, but I believe that its merely a show of neoconservatism. By helping in the development of democracy in Libya, the Western nations are ridding themselves of a problematic dictator, hence I believe that  for many of those countries, 'democracy and human rights are only important because their spread --and the defeat of tyranny-- is the best way to guarantee the safety of the US' [4]. Thus, I belive that Ignatieff's denial that 'national interest [...] must determine foreign policy to the exclusion of considerations of justice'[5] is quite Utopian-- such a thing would require a change of heart in politicians as well as citizens.

All in all, I approve of Ignatieff's beliefs. However, what I am wary of, are the difficulties that would face him were he to become prime minister-- an entire nation's apathy and inaction, due to national interest. His ideology is idealistic but, in my eyes, flawed and perhaps not even applicable in the West, where countries are so focused on their own needs and desires.

But in my mind, Ignatieff will always be a winner.

W for winner, obviously. 

Democracy in Egypt: Hobbes vs. Locke

In an unprecedented popular movement, Egypt was able to rid itself of the 30 year autocratic rule of Hosni Mubarak. Thousands filled the capital's Tahrir square, protesting the corruption of the government and demanding their rights, their freedom. Men and women, youth and elderly, all stood side by side, with only one thing on their minds, the downfall of a regime that had never guaranteed or answered to their rights as individuals and citizens, and the hope of freedom and democracy.

The happenings in Egypt, and in  fact, throughout the entire Middle East, demonstrate a people's ability to take back the power from its leader, and lead us to question the origins of power (in terms of a government's power, and state sovereignty) and whom it truly belongs to. Two political treatises can be applied when answering the question: those of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. I personally believe that the ideas propagated in Locke's Two Treatises of Government (1690) are most accurate, as it places rights at the centre of the entire problematic.

Whilst Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) entertained tye idea that human beings needed to be restrained from pursuing selfish ends by authority, as stated in his Leviathan (1651), John Locke believed in a contract between the people and the government, which was bilateral.

Both political philosophers believe that the power of the higher authority is the result of man giving up his right of governing himself (Leviathan) or in other words, 'puts on the bonds of Civil Society' (Two Treatises  of Government). However while both believe in the same origin of power, they differ on whom holds the power.

Hobbes expressed the idea of the reduction of man's will, by plurality of voices, unto one will,  in which case, the multitude so united in one person is called a commonwealth and this authority has absolute use of all power and strength conferred on him (Leviathan). What this propagates, of course, is dictatorships and autocratic governments in which the rights of the citizens are given up entirely to the State, for it to do with them as it sees fit.

On the other hand, Locke believes that upon putting on the bonds of Civil Society, man gives up all his power, necessary to the ends for which they unite into Society, to the majority of the Community (Two Treatises  of Government). Hence, the power allotted to the government truly belongs to the majority, to the people, and is only held by the State as long as it protects the rights of its people.

This opposition in the ideas of Locke and Hobbes become more pronounced as we apply them to the context of the uprising in Egypt.

During the 2011 Egyptian Revolution, the Egyptian citizens were growing fatigued of the corruption of their government, the lack of services available to them, etc. Their rights and needs were not being met by the State and hence, in terms of Locke's ideas, the Legislators had but themselves into a state of War with the People, who were thereupon absolved from any farther obedience (Two Treatises  of Government).  Hobbe's theory of power belonging to one person, and society being in a state of peace only under the supreme authority of a leading power, are thus proven incorrect, as the Egyptians were revolting, and in fact, installing a state of war, because of those conditions.

As Locke explained, if a government does not tend to the rights, freedom and equality of the people, then 'it devolves to the People, who have a Right to resume their original Liberty and, by the establishment of a new Legislative provide for their own safety and security, which is the end for which they are in Society' (Two Treatises  of Government).

Hence, what occurred in Egypt starting January 25th and ending with the overturning of the autocratic government and the beginning of a new democratic regime (preparations for votes) is a perfect example of Lockian ideals.

Hugo Chavez, the Machiavellian Prince?

The Prince, a political treatise by Italian theorist Niccolò Machiavelli, portrays and examines political leaders skilled in the art of realpolitik, that is, the craft of building and maintaining power in political and diplomatic terms. The main premise of the book relies on the belief that 'the end justifies the mean'; a prince may indulge in the most cruel and immoral of actions, so long as in the end, he has acquired stable and substantial power.

However, The Prince was published in 1532, an era in which autocrats were a common occurrence and absolute power was, to a certain degree, something easily achieved and maintained. However with the advent and global surge of democracy, the possibility for leaders to become Machiavellian princes dimmed substantially and to this day remains minute.

Hence, when talking of modern day 'Machiavellian princes', a mere dozen or so could be named. Among those few is Hugo Chavez, whom I consider to be the prime example of Machiavellian ideals and logic. Chavez is the 56th and current president of Venezuela, a position he has held since 1999, and reigns under his own ideology of Bolivarianism and 'Socialism for the 20th Century'. His ability to secure his position of power and in fact cultivate it into something near absolute, whilst opposing the opposing the most powerful country in the world is the what characterize him as a Machiavellian prince.  

I. The prince secures himself [...] by avoiding being hated or despised and by keeping the people satisfied with him.

No contemporary leader has followed this staple advice propagated in Machiavelli's The Prince as well as Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez. In his article The Unfulfilled Promises of Hugo Chavez,   Francisco Rodriguez (Council of Foreign Relations), said the following of the Venezuelan president:

"Although opinions differ on whether Chávez's rule should be characterized as authoritarian or democratic, just about everyone appears to agree that, in contrast to his predecessors, Chávez has made the welfare of the Venezuelan poor his top priority"

It is this steadfast and globally acknowledged devotion to the redressing of social injustices and inequality that have alloted him the popular support of his own citizens and the people of Latin America. To them he is the Latin American hero fighting for solidarity and human rights in the face of an overbearing and powerful United States. His series of Bolivarian Missions have led to achievements in addressing illiteracy, healthcare and poverty as well as benefitted economic and social advances, as recorded by a 2010 OAS report.  

Popular support has been a mostly steadfast companion to Chavez's political and presidential career; he gained the title of Venezuelan president in a landslide victory of 56.2% during the elections of 1999, and following the 2002 attempted coup d'etat, was returned to power after a wave of protests in support of his regime. 

2. [...] And never in peaceful times must he be idle; but he must turn them diligently to his advantage in order to be able to profit from them in times of adversity, so that, when fortune changes, she will find him prepared to withstand such times.

3. [...] A prince should void ever joining forces with one more powerful than himself against others unless necessity compels it [...]; for you remain his prisoner if you win, and princes should avoid, as much as possible, being left at the mercy of others.  

Here it is interesting to observe the manner in which Chavez interprets these words of advice and creates an interplay that satisfies both in a straightforward and unobstructive manner (in terms of his political and ideological preferences).  Chavez has chosen throughout the years, particularly following the election of George W. Bush as president and the failed coup of 2002, to oppose the most powerful country in the world, the United States, in any way possible, be it ideological, political or diplomatic. 

The U.S. Department of State describe the U.S.-Venezuela relationship as being tense and says the following: 

President Chavez continues to define himself in opposition to the United States, using incendiary rhetoric to insult the U.S. Government and U.S. influence in Latin America. 

Chavez has managed to create an enemy of the state, through continuous opposition and criticism and aided by the already tense relationship between Latin American countries and the U.S. due to their historical baggage. The Venezuelan people are united not only by their desire of Latin American solidarity, but also by their dislike of U.S. policies and ideas. 

To maintain this civilian opposition, Chavez keeps his citizens under the fear of a potential U.S. invasion. In 2006 Chávez called for restructuring the armed forces, including increased reserves (from 30,000 in 2004 to 150,000 in 2006) and the mobilization of the Guardia Territorial (Territorial Guard) which would be a completely civilian reserve (Venezuela under Chavez, Roger F. Noriega). 

These actions are all but a mere glimpse into the manner in which Chavez demonstrates the characteristics and logic of a Machiavellian prince. The fact that he has been able to maintain his power despite such strong opposition, and was in fact able to abolish presidential term limits in 2009 (Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela), through a referendum, are all proof of his success.